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This paper seeks to cause trouble for a brand of consequentialism 
known as “desertarianism”. In somewhat different ways, views of 
this kind evaluate outcomes more favourably, other things equal, the 
better the fit between the welfare different people enjoy and the 
welfare they each deserve. These views imply that we can improve 
outcomes by redistributing welfare to fit desert, which seems 
plausible enough. Unfortunately, they also imply that we can 
improve outcomes by redistributing desert to fit welfare: in other 
words, by making happy people more deserving, at the cost of 
making unhappy people less deserving. Extant versions of 
desertarianism predict that such “deservingness transfers” are 
improvements and that we ought to carry them out. Even worse, they 
will sometimes rank deservingness transfers higher than simply 
benefitting deserving people who are poorly off. 
 
Desertarianism is a form of consequentialism that includes 
considerations of desert in the evaluation of outcomes. It has significant 
intuitive appeal. Given a world where the wicked prosper and the 
virtuous suffer, and an otherwise similar world where the reverse is 
true, most people would say the latter is better. 
I will present an objection to views of this kind. I describe a case where 
we can cause a happy but undeserving person to become more 
deserving, in a way that unavoidably will also cause a highly deserving 
but unhappy person to become less deserving. The contemplated act 
will, in other words, produce a “deservingness transfer”. Desertarian 
views imply, implausibly, that this transfer will improve the outcome 
and that we ought to carry it out. Even worse, they will sometimes rank 
deservingness transfers higher than simply benefitting deserving people 
who are poorly off. 
One desertarian, Richard Arneson, has anticipated a similar but weaker 
objection. His main reply hinges on the way in which the objection he 
anticipates is weaker, and will not help here. However, he also suggests 
another reply, namely to deny that it is possible to influence other 
people’s deservingness, which would prevent the problem from arising 
to begin with. In response, I show that the price of this reply is that it 
needs a radical view of the desert base, the feature in virtue of which 
people become more or less deserving. It cannot include virtue, good or 
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evil deeds, or even effort. It must, in other words, reject many of the 
intuitions that attract people to desertarianism in the first place. 
1. Desertarianism 
First some parameters for the discussion. This paper has a restricted and 
shamelessly negative aim: to press an objection against a group of 
consequentialist views, which I will describe in this section. I will not 
assess how other ethical theories that include some role for desert 
would fare against the objection, nor attempt any general discussion of 
the place of desert in moral theory. 
The views I will discuss are defined by two features: a) they include 
considerations of desert (in ways I will shortly describe) in the 
evaluation of outcomes, and b) they say that right action is action that 
brings about the best available outcome (or one of the best, in case of 
ties). This kind of view is normally referred to as “desertarianism”, but 
just to be extra clear, we can borrow a term from Parfit and call it “telic 
desertarianism”. My target in this note is telic desertarianism, and 
nothing else. 
I find this kind of view a worthy target because, were it not for the 
objection I will shortly present, I would find it rather plausible. If some 
version of this view could be made to work, it would seem to combine 
the theoretical attractions of consequentialism (that we ought never 
deliberately make the world worse than we might) with judgments 
about cases that are more in line with pre-theoretical intuitions than 
those of utilitarianism. 
Like the views I will discuss, I will take welfare to be the “currency of 
desert”, the thing one can deserve more or less of. It will not matter for 
our purposes whether we think of it as welfare-in-life-as-a-whole or 
welfare-at-a-time.  
With the exception of Arneson (1999, 2007) and Hurka (2001), 
desertarians tend not to say much about the desert base, the feature that 
makes people more or less deserving. Instead, their focus has been to 
investigate what kind of structure the axiology should have. But they 
tend to think that virtue is at least a part of the desert base, and an 
unofficial convention seems to have developed, in giving examples and 
so on, to write as if the desert base is simply virtue, on the understanding 
that this is a stand-in for something potentially more complex.1 I will 
                                                 
1 Hurka (2001) thinks virtue is the desert base, while Kagan thinks it is either 
the whole or a large part of it (2012: 6-7). Feldman includes virtue (2002: 623) 
and “moral worthiness” (1995: 574) in his list of likely desert bases. Skow 
(2012: 235-7), Valentyne (1995: 208-9) and Arrhenius (2007: 17) use virtue in 
their examples, but are officially agnostic about the desert base. Carlson (1997) 
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follow that convention in this section and the next, and return to the 
issue of the desert base in section 3. 
There are two main kinds of telic desertarianism. The first treats people 
getting what they deserve as an intrinsic value, which makes an 
independent contribution to the value of outcomes. The other treats 
desert as a modifier, which affects the way welfare contributes to 
outcome value. 
Defenders of the first kind of view include Shelly Kagan (2012), 
Thomas Hurka (2001), and, at least as a friendly commentator, Gustaf 
Arrhenius (2007). I will briefly present Kagan’s view for purposes of 
illustration. Kagan actually defends two intrinsic values having to do 
with desert. The first, noncomparative desert, works as follows. To 
increasing levels of virtue, there correspond increasing amounts of 
welfare that people at those virtue levels deserve. If a person gets 
exactly the welfare she deserves, that has intrinsic value. If she gets 
more or less than she deserves, this value declines (eventually going 
negative) the further away (in either direction) she is from getting what 
she deserves. This intrinsic value is computed for each person 
individually, and added to or subtracted from the total value of the 
outcome, together with any other values, such as welfare, that we 
recognize. 
(This last point is important. Suppose for example that a mildly virtuous 
person enjoys enormous welfare. This will have negative value, so far 
as noncomparative desert is concerned. But for Kagan, the welfare as 
such has independent value, making the overall situation positive). 
The second value, comparative desert, is more complicated, having to 
do with the pattern of fit between welfare and virtue in a world. If 
everybody has exactly what they deserve, or they all overshoot or all 
undershoot in ways that “offend equally against noncomparative 
desert”,2 comparative desert is satisfied. This has intrinsic value, which 
is added to the overall value of the outcome. The further away from this 
condition a world is, the less there is of this intrinsic value (it will often 
be negative). 
Desert-as-modifier theorists include Fred Feldman (1995, 2002, 2006), 
Eric Carlson (1997), Richard Arneson (1999, 2007) and Bradford Skow 
(2012).3 Feldman’s view is probably the best known, but Skow’s has 
the advantage of being statable as an equation (Feldman’s is expressed 
                                                 
criticises Feldman’s axiology, and proposes an alternative, without dissenting 
about the desert base. 
2 To spell out this condition would take many pages; see Kagan (2012: ch. 8). 
3 Peter Vallentyne (1995) also develops a desert-as-modifier view, without 
officially endorsing it. 
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in prose, with illustrative graphs). It will therefore be convenient to use 
Skow’s version for purposes of illustration, but the objection I will 
make applies equally to all these views. 
Skow’s view works as follows. The impartial value a person’s welfare 
contributes to an outcome is a function of the welfare she deserves and 
the welfare she enjoys, given by this equation: 
 
The details here are not important for our purposes.4 Consider instead 
this graph, to illustrate the substance of Skow’s view:  
 
The impartial value of each person’s welfare is calculated according to 
                                                 
4 k is a constant used to make the equation “dimensionally consistent”. On the 
left hand side we have impartial value (good), and on the right hand side we 
have welfare (good for). Since these are different quantities, it would be 
confused to assert an identity between some amount of impartial value and 
some amount of welfare. So we need to add a constant that “translates” 
between the two quantities. For example, if hedons are our measure of welfare 
and morons our measure of impartial value, then k might be 1 moron/hedon or 
9,81 morons/hedon. For simplicity, I have drawn the grap and calculated the 
tables below in a way that assumes the number in k is 1. Giving it some other 
value would make no substantive difference. 
The purpose of e (Euler’s number) divided by 2 is to make the factor “ln (…)” 
come out to 1 in the case where a person gets exactly what she deserves. 
Skow’s view is only meant to cover cases where both welfare and desert are 
positive. As one can see on the graph, the lines approach the y-axis above zero, 
suggesting that Skow’s view also places some independent value on 
deservingness. But as we shall see in section 3, that makes no difference to the 
objection I will present. 
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this function, and then added together to get the overall value of the 
outcome. 
2. Deservingness transfers 
Now for the objection. The consequentialist literature is full of debates 
about which welfare transfers would, and which would not, make 
outcomes better. But if outcome value is some function of the 
distributions of both welfare and desert, it follows that we can make 
outcomes better, not just by redistributing welfare, but also by 
redistributing desert. This has ungainly implications. Consider: 
Happy Nasty and Unhappy Nice are stranded on a deserted 
island. We are unable to affect their welfare. We are, however, 
able to place a copy of Reasons and Persons in Happy Nasty’s 
possession in a way that will unavoidably also put a copy of 
The Art of The Deal in Unhappy Nice’s possession.5 If we do 
this, it will predictably lead Happy Nasty to become a bit more 
virtuous and Unhappy Nice to become a bit less virtuous. 
On Kagan’s view, this transfer will improve the situation in several 
ways. Since the virtue of each is brought closer to what it would need 
to be for them to deserve the welfare levels they are at, each of their 
noncomparative desert scores go up. And the comparative desert score 
of their island improves as well, for even though their welfare levels 
still “offend against noncomparative desert” in opposite directions, they 
now do so to lesser degrees. Since neither’s welfare is affected, these 
are all net gains in outcome value. 
To see how the example plays out on Skow’s view, we can run the 
numbers for some illustrative values of welfare and desert: 
 
The deservingness transfer improves the outcome considerably. The 
positive effect on how Happy Nasty’s welfare is “discounted” (raising 
the impartial value of her 10 units of welfare from 2,7 to 4,2), is greater 
than the negative effect on the way Unhappy Nice’s welfare is “marked 
up” (lowering the impartial value of her 1 unit of welfare from 4,0 to 
3,7). 
                                                 
5 Perhaps we can float them a map in a bottle showing where the books are 
buried, and we know that Happy Nasty will grab the book with the nicest cover 
picture. 
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Even worse, Kagan and Skow’s views imply that deservingness 
transfers can be better than benefitting deserving people with low 
welfare. Let us add a third option to the example above: suppose we can 
instead benefit Unhappy Nice a little, by floating her a first aid kit. So 
long as the benefit is small, Skow’s view implies that this option is less 
good than the deservingness transfer: 
 
Kagan does not express his view numerically, or tell us how heavily 
desert weighs against other values. But so long as he puts any weight 
on desert (without which it would be irrelevant) his view will have 
implications of the same kind. 
We can imagine real-world scenarios with the same structure. Consider 
a sharply divided society, with a rich class living high and a poor class 
scraping by. Suppose the political situation renders us powerless to do 
anything about this welfare distribution. We are, however, able to 
intervene (say, by making changes to the programming on state 
television) in a way that will, over time, cause the rich to become 
marginally more virtuous and the poor to become marginally less 
virtuous. Assuming, again, that this will have no net effect on the 
welfare levels of the two classes, Kagan and Skow’s views predict that 
it will nevertheless make the outcome better and that we ought to carry 
it out, by the same logic that we have explored above. 
All these results are morally implausible. Given a world where the 
virtuous suffer and the wicked prosper, it seems perverse to think that 
the right response can be to take away some of the virtuous’s virtue and 
give it to the wicked. And it seems even more perverse that such 
interventions can be better than benefitting people who are both 
virtuous and poorly off. 
That is the objection. Now some comments about its scope. I defined 
telic desertarianism as the combination of desertarian axiology, and act 
consequentialism. Which part does the objection target? 
It targets their conjunction. An act consequentialist can of course avoid 
the objection by not having a desertarian axiology. A desertarian who 
wants to keep her axiology can avoid the objection by abandoning or 
qualifying her act consequentialism. For example, she could introduce 
a non-consequentialist constraint or reason against “deservingness 
sabotage”, the intentional reduction of someone’s deservingness. Then, 
she can say, even though the outcome where Happy Nasty is a bit less 
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nasty, and Unhappy Nice a bit less nice, is better than the status quo, 
this constraint blocks us from acting to bring it about.6 
But I doubt whether a desertarian could plausibly just add this 
constraint and otherwise leave the view as it was. The question is how 
stable the resulting view would be. Once we open the floodgates to non-
consequentialist reasons or constraints, why just that one? Why not one 
against, say, breaking promises? Why not theft and murder? But if we 
pile on constraints, we will gradually abandon the consequentialist 
attempt to explain right action, and end up with something that looks 
more like a Rossian plurality of duties, including – like Ross’ view – a 
duty to promote the good. 
Alternatively, she may try to ground a constraint against deservingness 
sabotage in some more general principle, perhaps against violating 
autonomy, or treating people as mere means. But that would of course 
take her straight to a much wider departure from consequentialism. 
Once we pick up such a principle, we cannot put it down again at will. 
If we shouldn’t sabotage people’s deservingness because that would 
violate their autonomy, then there are presumably lots of other optimific 
things we shouldn’t do because they would violate people’s autonomy. 
As mentioned earlier, I find telic desertarianism interesting because, if 
it worked, it would seem able to combine the theoretical and 
explanatory virtues of consequentialism with verdicts about cases that 
are closer to common sense than those of utilitarianism. For the reasons 
just given, it seems difficult for a desertarian to respond to the transfer 
problem by just adding a constraint against deservingness sabotage, 
without a wider sacrifice to the first of these motivations. 
A different response, which would retain both motivations, would be to 
try to enrich the axiology. Instead of a constraint against deservingness 
sabotage, a desertarian could count it as an intrinsic evil, a bad thing, to 
be included when we evaluate outcomes. Of course, the examples also 
include the opposite intervention, which we might call “deservingness 
assistance”. But if she introduced a suitable asymmetry, either not 
counting deservingness assistance as intrinsically good, or less good 
than sabotage is bad, she could presumably arrange the overall axiology 
in such a way that it does not count deservingness transfers as net 
improvements. 
Unfortunately, this modified view is vulnerable to a modified form of 
the objection (which also gets around any constraints against 
deservingness sabotage). There are cases that exhibit a similar logic to 
the examples above, without requiring sabotage of anyone’s 
                                                 
6 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to clarify this. 
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deservingness, but simply assisting them less than others. Some people 
have a sunny disposition, being naturally disposed to enjoy life in a 
wide range of circumstances. Others are gloomier by default, not 
disposed to stay happy for long even in fortunate circumstances. If we 
assume that happiness is at least one component of welfare, even the 
modified view would imply, ceteris paribus, that other people 
(including parents and teachers) should allocate their deservingness-
assisting efforts more towards those with a sunny than those with a 
gloomy disposition. That way, those who are going to have more 
welfare anyway will also be more deserving, at the cost of leaving those 
who are going to have less welfare anyway less deserving. Such a 
policy seems morally implausible in much the same way as the original 
result. 
Returning to the question of the scope of the main objection, does it 
target all telic desertarian views? For concreteness, I have shown how 
deservingness transfers produce unpleasant implications for one desert-
as-intrinsic-value view and one desert-as-modifier view. The objection 
generalizes along one dimension but not along another. It can be 
avoided if we are willing to make some very strong claims about the 
desert base, a point I will return to. But so long as virtue, or some other 
feature that can be affected by other people’s actions, is part of the 
desert base, I cannot see how any of the desertarian views in the 
literature would avoid the objection. Despite subtle differences in 
axiology, these views all imply that outcomes are better when their 
welfare distributions fit their desert distributions. Therefore, we can 
make outcomes better by improving the fit between welfare and 
deservingness. But so far as the axiology is concerned, it makes no 
difference whether we do this by redistributing welfare to fit desert, or 
by redistributing desert to fit welfare. 
Despite the differing shapes of their axiologies, then, the objection 
generalizes to telic desertarian views that include virtue in the desert 
base, among them Kagan, Feldman and Hurka’s, and apparently also 
Arrhenius, Carlson and Skow’s.7 
3. The desert base 
Richard Arneson, however, may possess a means of escape. In Desert 
and Equality (2007), he anticipates an objection that is similar but, as 
we will see, importantly weaker: 
Suppose that we can by action now affect the extent to which 
people, ourselves or others, are deserving in the future. Then if 
                                                 
7 See footnote 1. 
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morality requires, inter alia, that one bring it about that people 
achieve good fortune proportionate to their desert, it will 
sometimes be right to bring it about that a well-being gain 
should go to a (now) less deserving rather than to a more 
deserving person, just because this (as it seems) deliberate 
maldistribution will bring it about that those who are now more 
deserving will become less deserving. Maybe the mistreated 
will become inappropriately resentful or envious. This apparent 
implication of my view is weird and counterintuitive. (2007: 
285)8 
Arneson has two replies. The first is to suggest that he may not face this 
problem in the first place, because his account of the desert base may 
render it impossible for one person to affect another’s deservingness. 
Call this the impossibility reply. He does not pursue this branch of the 
argument very far, however, and leaves it open whether this reply will 
work in the end (2007: 286). 
Arneson’s second reply takes up the other branch of the argument, i.e. 
what to say if it is possible to influence others’ deservingness. What he 
says here hinges on a difference between our objection and the one he 
anticipates, namely that the latter involves reducing someone’s 
deservingness without increasing anyone else’s. This allows him to 
reply that his view will not recommend making people less deserving, 
even when that would improve the fit between welfare and desert, 
because it is intrinsically valuable that people are more deserving. He 
develops this claim further by embracing a “prioritarianism of desert”, 
which says that desert has decreasing marginal value. In other words, 
an incremental unit of deservingness has more impartial value if it goes 
to a sinner than if it goes to a saint (2007: 286-288). 
But appealing to the intrinsic value of deservingness will not help 
against deservingness transfers, which do not involve any net loss of 
deservingness. (This is why my argument in section 2 focused on 
transfers rather than uncompensated deservingness reductions.) And a 
prioritarianism of desert will in many cases even make the problem 
worse. For example, in the case of Happy Nasty and Unhappy Nice, we 
could transfer desert from the more deserving to the less deserving. 
Arneson’s prioritarianism of desert would only make this transfer more 
attractive, perhaps making it better than simply giving Unhappy Nice 
two extra units of welfare. 
With or without the prioritarianism of desert, then, we can conclude that 
                                                 
8 Arneson credits Ingmar Persson for bringing the objection to his attention 
(Arneson 2007: 284, n. 18). Gustaf Arrhenius (2007: 18) discusses a similar 
objection. 
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for Arneson to escape our objection, he needs the impossibility reply. 
This returns us to the question, which turns out to be crucial for the 
prospects of telic desertarianism, of what the desert base is, and whether 
it is possible to transfer it. 
Let us say that the desert base is “insulated” if it is impossible to 
influence other people’s deservingness, making deservingness transfers 
impossible. What kind of view can we take of the desert base, if we 
want it to be insulated? We cannot include virtue, since it is clearly 
possible to influence other people’s virtuousness, say by raising 
children well or neglecting them. Nor can right action or evil deeds in 
themselves count, as the same example illustrates. Even effort, if 
understood in the usual way, cannot be included, since one can at least 
to some degree socialize people into habits of exertion or sluggishness. 
Arneson’s own account is a good example of the kind of view we must 
try if we want to insulate the desert base. As a first pass, he takes the 
desert base to be conscientiousness: “the degree to which they are 
steadily disposed to pursue what they believe to be right and good, 
provided that they have made good-faith efforts to discover what is 
genuinely right and good and are not culpable for embracing false 
beliefs” (2007: 272). But he recognizes that an agent’s 
conscientiousness, in this sense, is shaped by nature and nurture like 
any other part of her psychology. To correct for this, he says that the 
desert base is not strictly an agent’s conscientiousness, but the 
contribution made to her level of conscientiousness by her uncaused 
free will (2007: 275-7).9 
Causa sui free will is of course a hefty metaphysical commitment. But 
let us simply take note of that without trying to assess its plausibility. 
Let us instead look at some normative implications of the account. A 
very distinctive part is that it concerns how people strive for what they 
believe to be good and right, where this should be read de dicto: 
the deserving [person’s] will is decisively oriented toward a 
blank check: she aims to do whatever it is that is morally right, 
                                                 
9 I should add that Arneson elsewhere is open to a compatibilist account of free 
will (2004: 10-11, 1999: 239, 2007: 273, n. 11). If I read him correctly, his 
overall view is best understood as a series of conditionals: if libertarian free 
will exists, he will understand the desert base as described in this section, and 
give the impossibility reply. If some kind of compatibilism is true, he will grant 
that it is possible to influence others’ deservingness, and instead give the 
“prioritarianism of desert” reply (2007: 286). And if hard determinism is true, 
he will abandon desertarianism and be a plain egalitarian/prioritarian (2004: 
9). 
Since we are here exploring the impossibility reply, I take the liberty of 
ascribing to Arneson the assumptions that go with that reply. 
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and she tries to fill in the content of this aim by thinking 
through as best she can where the balance of moral reasons 
points […] (2007: 277) 
As Arneson admits, this implies that a conscientious Nazi will be highly 
deserving, given that conscientious Nazis are possible, i.e. that it is 
possible to be socialized into a good faith belief in Nazi morals (2007: 
273). Another unpleasant implication concerns what we might call 
unreflective saints. It seems possible to be superbly morally good 
without having any explicit moral beliefs. Consider for example a 
Forrest Gump-like character, who is spontaneously kind and generous, 
without a thought in his head about right and wrong. Arneson’s account 
does not give him any points for this. 
A recurring theme in Arneson’s writings on desert is the need to 
distinguish between intrinsic deservingness and instrumental 
considerations. Social norms that dole out blame and punishment to 
conscientious Nazis, and praise and reward to Forrest Gumps, are of 
course immensely useful, by incentivizing pro-social behaviour. It is 
not surprising that these norms have a strong grip on common sense 
intuitions (1999: 240-1, 2007: 267-8). 
But let us try to correct for that. Suppose Forrest Gump and the 
conscientious Nazi have been permanently stranded on two deserted 
islands. We can ship a hammock and a mosquito net to one of them. 
Arneson’s view implies that the conscientious Nazi deserves it more 
and should get it, other things equal. 
My purpose has not been to refute Arneson’s view, but simply to bring 
out some of its radical implications. There are of course other views one 
might try, in order to insulate the desert base. We come into contact 
here with the literature on moral responsibility. That literature is 
massive, and it would be madness to try to settle any deep questions 
here. Let me instead end by flagging a crucial difference that should not 
get lost in translation between that literature and the debate over 
desertarianism. 
The central notions in the responsibility literature are moral praise- and 
blameworthiness. It is an open question whether deservingness, as it 
figures in desertarian theory, is the same thing. Thus, even if a given 
view should be plausible as an account of praise/blameworthiness, it 
does not follow that we can plug it into a desertarian theory, as an 
account of deservingness, without loss of plausibility. 
For example, there are accounts of responsibility that seek something 
at least in the direction of insulation: when assigning credit for good or 
bad actions, they adjust for how difficult it was for the agent to act well 
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or avoid acting badly. The guiding principle is that people are 
responsible for how they play the cards they are dealt, but not for their 
starting hand. Thus, if the conscientious Nazi is the way she is because 
she has been raised in a Nazi family, we adjust for the fact that this 
makes it extremely difficult for her to act well. Her blameworthiness 
might be small. Conversely, if Gump has simply been handed a saintly 
nature, making it easy for him to act well, we adjust for that. His 
praiseworthiness might be small. 
An important resource for defenders of views of this kind is to introduce 
distinctions between different kinds of moral evaluation. For example, 
following Watson (1996), they can distinguish between “accountability 
blame” (expressed in indignation and resentment) and “attributability 
blame” (moral admiration or disdain, expressed in terms such as brave, 
lousy, virtous, etc). Thus, to defend her view’s witholding of one kind 
of negative response to the conscientious Nazi (accountability blame), 
the theorist can soften the blow by offering us another kind of negative 
response instead (attributability blame/disdain). And to defend the 
witholding of accountability-praise from Forrest Gump, she can soften 
the blow by offering attributability-praise (admiration) instead (Nelkin 
2016: 368). 
When deciding on a desert base for the purposes of a desertarian 
normative theory, however, we cannot do this kind of double 
scorekeeping. Virtue is either included in the desert base, or it isn’t. We 
can count good and evil deeds in full, or adjust in some way for 
difficulty, but we cannot do both. And it seems a very different task to 
defend the view that Forrest Gump isn’t highly deserving of welfare, 
than to defend the view that he is attribuatbility-praiseworthy rather 
than accountability-praiseworthy. 
There are significant challenges, then, if we want to insulate the desert 
base. We need, first, some distinction between “the cards one is dealt” 
and “how one plays them”, which renders it impossible for others to 
influence how someone plays their cards. It is not clear whether such a 
distinction can be drawn without invoking libertarian free will. And we 
have to make plausible, second, that it is how someone in the relevant 
sense “plays their cards”, and nothing else, that decides their 
deservingness. Without a view of that sort about the desert base, we get 
the problem of deservingness transfers. 
4. Conclusion 
We have considered a fairly simple objection. Telic desertarianism says 
that outcomes are better, ceteris paribus, when their welfare 
distributions fit their desert distributions, and that we should act to bring 
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about such outcomes. The objection is that these views are blind to the 
moral difference between achieving such outcomes by giving people 
what they deserve, and by making them such as to deserve what they 
have got. 
The objection applies to the most common form of desertarianism, 
which combines the view that virtue and/or good behaviour is at least a 
part of the desert base, with the telic assumption that the right place to 
locate considerations of desert in moral theory is in the value of 
outcomes. Three solutions suggest themselves: to develop a non-telic 
form of desertarianism; to develop an account of the desert base that 
insulates it from outside influence; or to abandon desertarianism 
altogether.10 
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